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According to the transaction cost economics literature, a firm’s external 
contractual relationships must be ‘fit for purpose’. What is a ‘fit for 
purpose’ contractual relationship should not be a normative decision, but 
an objective one, to be made with regard to achieving transaction cost 
efficiency, while defending the core competencies of the firm. Data from 
a Hong Kong case study are used to examine whether or not the client’s 
choice of contractual relationship is ‘fit for purpose’ and also to evaluate 
the impact of such a choice. The findings suggest that maintaining a 
relationship of high quality as a strategic policy not only reduces 
recourse to the contract, but also improves the quality and predictability 
of project performance and is an antidote to ill-aligned contractual 
elements. These findings lend support to the growing trend towards 
relationship or relational contracting in construction. 





This paper seeks to contribute to a better understanding of clients’ choices of 
contractual relations and the consequences of such choices. The paper starts by 
examining the background to contractual relations in the construction industry. The 
theoretical basis for predicting what would be a ‘fit for purpose’ contractual relationship 
is then discussed. Data from a case study construction project are explored to explain 
the nature of and rationale for the choices made and the consequences thereof.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Construction has been identified as a complex systems industry, where organising-by-
projects, temporary coalitions of firms and a heavy client involvement in the product life 
cycle are the norm (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, Shirazi et al., 1996). Construction coping 
strategies - competitive tendering, arms-length contracts and industry ‘communities of 
practice’ allow these complexity dimensions to be addressed (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002, Shirazi et al., 1996). These are contained in standard forms of contract designed 
to reduce the costs associated with writing bespoke contracts (Thompson et al., 1998). 
These coping strategies create a pattern of ‘tight’ and ‘loose’ couplings in construction 
contracts, which result in adversarial relationships and a focus on short-term 
productivity, while hampering innovation and learning. One cooperation strategy has 
been to introduce performance incentives, but their impact has been largely negative. 
Ashley and Workman (1986) found that although overall performance was marginally 
greater with their use, incentives created significantly more disputes and contractual 
disagreements. Emphasis is thus being placed on alternative forms of control that 
facilitate cooperative (i.e. trust-based) relationships. There have also been bold 
attempts to contractualise trust by including in partnering-oriented standard forms of 
contract, express terms that seek to prescribe and govern the behaviours of and 
relationships between contracting parties (e.g., ACA, 2000). While the legal status of 
such clauses has been questioned (e.g., Cornes, 1996) and their practical import is as 
yet unknown, cooperative strategies like partnering and alliancing are paradigmatic. THEORY 
Cox and Thompson (1997) are very critical of this trend where cooperative 
relationships are emphasised more or less as the end instead of a means to achieve 
organisational goals. They argue that the choice of a governing relationship must be an 
objective decision and must be complemented by an appropriate choice of form of 
contract. In other words, the contractual relationship must be ‘fit for purpose’. The basis 
for predicting what would be a ‘fit for purpose’ contractual relationship takes its roots 
from Williamson’s (1979) seminal work on the transaction cost economics framework. 
Williamson’s work projected the notion of the firm as a nexus of contracts. The initial 
framework has been amended by Williamson (1985) and other researchers building on 
his work (e.g., Bradach and Eccles, 1989, Cox, 1996). The basic argument of this 
stream of thought is that one of three organisational forms, namely markets, 
hierarchies and relational contracting, is most efficient for the governance of a firm’s 
transactions. Market, hierarchy and relational contracting map roughly onto price, 
authority and trust (Bradach and Eccles, 1989).  
 
Three dimensions of transactions determine which one of the three organisational 
forms is most efficient. These dimensions affect the costs associated with writing, 
executing and enforcing contracts and are: uncertainty, asset specificity, and 
transaction frequency (Williamson, 1985). Hierarchies are more efficient than arms-
length market transactions in situations of high uncertainty, high asset specificity and 
frequent recontracting. The uncertainties about future performance and contingencies 
complicate the writing of contracts, the high asset specificity may lead to opportunistic 
bargaining and, frequent recontracting is costly. In these situations an authority relation 
(i.e. hierarchy – e.g. vertical integration) is most efficient (Williamson, 1985). 
Intermediate levels of uncertainty and asset specificity lead to intermediate 
organisational forms such as quasi-vertical integration. Williamson referred to such 
governance structures as “relational contracting”. In relational contracting, the costs 
consist of the investments necessary to build trust through commitment to a norm of 
reciprocity (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). Obviously, these costs must be less than the 
costs involved in writing, executing and enforcing contracts.   
 
The transaction cost economics approach has been criticised for failing to explain a 
growing number of contradictory empirical observations (for a review, see Oberschall 
and Leifer, 1986). Cox (1996) amended Williamson’s notion of asset specificity as 
related to sunk costs and the level of uncertainty in the market, to one related to the 
core competences of the firm, which it must defend in order to survive and prosper in 
the market place. Cox then goes on to define a continuum of relational contracting 
strategies namely, preferred supplier, single sourcing, network sourcing and strategic 
alliances. Cox and colleagues (Cox and Thompson, 1997, Thompson et al., 1998: Fig. 
6) propose and test, in the context of the construction industry, a model that matches 
this continuum of relational contracting strategies with a corresponding typology of 
contract types. Bradach and Eccles (1989) view such attempts to pitch price, authority 
and trust as mutually exclusive control mechanisms or as defining a continuum of 
governance structures, as misleading. Citing evidence from different business settings, 
they demonstrate that price, authority and trust are independent control mechanisms 
that can be combined in a variety of different ways. The evidence in the construction 
industry, and as discussed above, is equally compelling (see e.g., Eccles, 1981, 
Stinchcombe, 1985). Despite its limitations, the amended transaction cost economics 
approach provides a framework that facilitates an objective decision on which one or a 
combination of forms of control (i.e. price, authority and trust) is most efficient to 
achieve the goals of the firm, however ambiguous these may be.  
 A HONG KONG CASE STUDY 
The data reported in this paper are drawn from a case study undertaken as part of a 
larger research project aimed at developing a management support system to aid the 
formulation of more effective and efficient construction procurement and operational 
systems. The fieldwork was conducted between April 2005 and May 2006. The data 
reported in this paper are extracted from the project documentation and semi-
structured interviews with six project directors from the client, consultant and contractor 
teams, three senior project managers from the main contractor and client’s in-house 
project management teams and, two subcontractors. The interviews were recorded and 
the resultant transcripts (numbering over 130 pages in total) were coded to reflect 
common themes and other emergent issues. Only data relating to the use and impact 
of contractual incentive arrangements, as well as other motivations for cooperation are 
analysed in this paper. The client in this project is a prestigious property developer that 
owns and manages prime office and retail space in Hong Kong. 
 
PROJECT OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND STRATEGIES 
The project involved the redevelopment of an existing office tower in Hong Kong at a 
total construction cost of US$82 million. The project’s objectives were: to create a small 
grade ‘A’ office building; to complement and extend an existing luxury retail space; and 
also to provide more food and beverage space. Other client drivers included the need 
to provide assurance that construction costs are competitive and reflect the current 
market price levels and, to improve relationships with contracting partners through a 
partnering ‘offensive’. The scope of works involved demolishing the existing office 
tower, supplementing the existing foundations and erecting a steel-cored 
superstructure tower (25 floors). This involved three separate and sequential contracts 
for the demolition, foundation and the superstructure works. Table 1 provides 
summarised details of the procurement and contractual arrangements in this project.  
All three main contracts were negotiated and let to the same main contractor under the 
JCT-based HKSAR standard form of building contract (private edition – with quantities). 
Formal partnering with a non-binding charter was adopted with the active involvement 
of the client, consultants, main and subcontractors.   
 
PROJECT COMPLEXITY DIMENSIONS 
The client required sectional completions to facilitate early hand-over of lower floors of 
the building to tenants to fit out as the works progressed. Three milestones, each 
related to the receipt of a temporary occupation permit (TOP), were established. 
Achieving these key dates was a priority for the client, communicated clearly to 
everyone involved and reinforced with liquidated damages clauses. The site is small 
and adjoins existing luxury retail and hotel space. The process for obtaining statutory 
approvals was very cumbersome, as some of the government departments concerned 
do not have statutory turn around times for dealing with submissions. The foundation 
works required that a new basement be constructed within an existing basement with 
an 8m head of water. When the existing office tower was first built, the adjoining street 
Table 1   Project procurement and contractual systems
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retention fund and 
performance bond
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Negotiated lump sum 
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Contractor's All-risks and 
Third Party Liability 
(CAR/TPL) insurance for 
projectcollapsed into the site and there was a risk of history repeating itself. The final method 
and sequence of construction adopted was itself innovative in the Hong Kong context. 
The superstructure steel core was the first of its kind for the client and was off-centred 
so that many of the floors were cantilevered. These factors introduced a steep learning 
curve, reduced flexibility in methods of and access for work and transportation of 
materials, increased site safety risks and created coordination problems. An extensive 
structural redesign, made two months into the construction stage, coupled with the 
large numbers of tenant-induced change requests, exacerbated the coordination 
problems. These factors interacted and transformed the project into a complex and 
risky undertaking. 
 
SELECTING A PARTNER 
Three main reasons explain the client’s decision to enter into single source 
negotiations with the main contractor. First of all, the main contractor has a reputation 
of being, perhaps, the best piling contractor in Hong Kong and was quite familiar with 
the ground conditions in that area. Secondly, the main contractor and the client belong 
to the same group holding company. The advantage to the client in being able to 
exercise some corporate leverage was thus very significant. Thirdly, the main 
contractor is committed to cooperation, adopts partnering as a corporate strategy on all 
its projects, and has worked successfully with the client on previous projects that also 
resulted in a significant sharing of savings. However, demonstrating the 
competitiveness of the main contractor’s pricing against the market was still a major 
requirement for award. All the consultants consistently stated as part of their project 
goals, the need to project and maintain a good long-term relationship with the client. 
They all (except the M&E consultant) had a previous history of successful dealings with 
the client on one or more projects involving the GMP methodology. The client, main 
contractor and consultants were, therefore, reasonably familiar with the ‘rules’ of the 
game (e.g., regarding negotiations, the GMP methodology) and had built up some trust 
while working on an open book basis.  
 
PROJECT OVERVIEW AND PERFORMANCE 
Many of the problems encountered could have spelt disaster for this project, but all of 
them were resolved and in some ways have become major successes for the project 
team. There was a shared sense of interdependence, respect and trust amongst the 
team. This was reflected in the quantity and quality of project communications, 
problem-solving, prosocial behaviours and, consequently, in the project performance 
outcomes. The foundation contract was completed ahead of schedule. All the TOPs for 
the superstructure contract have been consistently achieved and the occupation 
permit, due in a few months, is considered reasonably in sight. The outturn quality of 
the works was adjudged very good, despite some disappointment with the quality of the 
initial designs. So far, no serious site accident or major disruption to adjoining 
businesses has been reported. With the GMP adjudication process in its early phase, it 
is difficult to speculate about the outturn construction cost. However, some significant 
but modest procurement savings have been reported. The project has been awarded a 
provisional platinum rating (the highest possible rating) in the Hong Kong Building 
Environmental Assessment Method (HK-BEAM) certification exercise and has won six 
other industry awards. Yet, there was a sense that the project’s performance outcomes 
presented an incomplete picture of the level and impact of the teamwork experienced 
on the project. 
  
INCENTIVES, MOTIVATION AND COOPERATION 
INCENTIVE AND SANCTIONING SYSTEMS 
The traditional form of contract supports arms-length contractual relations that only 
lead to contractual compliance  (Thompson  et al., 1998). The fixed price lump sum contracts create a conflict of motive between the client and main contractor (Bower et 
al., 2002). Measures that allow some sharing of project risks and the associated 
pain/gain are considered as supportive of cooperative relations (Bower et al., 2002, 
Thompson et al.. 1998). The foundation and superstructure contracts had a fair number 
of such measures, as indicated in Table 1. The client took out a comprehensive 
employer-controlled contractor’s all-risks (CAR) and third-party liability (TPL) insurance 
for the entire project. This measure is also considered to support cooperative relations 
(see SFC, 2003). However, several factors associated with the intent, design, operation 
or outcome of these systems, raise doubts over what impact, if any, they have had on 
the cooperative behaviours of the project actors. Firstly, the client’s objective in taking 
out the CAR/TPL insurance was to be the first beneficiary named on the policy. The 
liquidated damages were based on cost (i.e. overheads) and were not related to the 
probable loss in rental income.  
 
The client also demanded guarantees on both the maximum cost and time for the 
project. This can be a recipe for disputes. However, conscious and deliberate choices 
were made by the main contractor (including some subcontractors) on the one hand 
not to claim on the provisions in the conditions of contract and, by the client on the 
other hand not to utilise the contractual safeguards. There was very little scope to 
create cost savings. The designs were 90% complete and the main contractor was 
engaged throughout that process. As such, all the value engineering was done pre-
contract and the savings incorporated into the GMP. Post-contract, the structural 
redesign effectively removed any scope (i.e. available float) for design refinement and 
value engineering. About 60% of the value of the works fell under named domestic 
subcontractors. These are, essentially, nominated subcontractors, except that in this 
arrangement the client is not legally liable for their default. The design development 
allowance was very modest (less than 2% of the GMP). Added to this was the fact that 




What then was the motivation for the high level of cooperation witnessed on this 
project? To start with, it is clear from the foregoing that the answer does not lie in the 
incentive and sanctioning systems used. There was consensus that the formal aspects 
of the partnering process – workshops, champions’ meetings, and periodic evaluation– 
were often neglected. Perhaps, these findings speak of the lack of conceptual-
definitional clarity on the entity of partnering (see Bresnen and Marshall, 2000a). There 
was a dominant client culture underlying the decision-making processes in this project. 
For the client’s in-house project management team, delivering projects through 
cooperation was a way of working that they enjoyed. The GMP contract, with the open 
book approach, provided the mechanism to cooperate by unifying the motives of the 
client, consultants and the main contractor (Bower et al., 2002). A distinctive feature of 
this project was the high number, frequency and long duration of meetings and all 
agreed that these had very little to do with the procurement or contractual 
arrangements. One project director, who was new to the team, concluded that in a 
sense the meetings had become self-sustaining and prevented people from just getting 
on with the job. While there was a general tendency for the in-house project 
management team to micro-manage, the benefits of participation were obvious. These 
meetings, undertaken in pursuit of ostensible goals, did not involve costs alone. 
Clearly, some members derived satisfaction from participating in these ‘costly’ activities 
(see Oberschall and Leifer, 1986: 246).  
 
It appears, however, that the cooperation on this project related more to the fairness of 
the client’s decision-making processes and outcomes. The consultants did not tender 
on fees and their remuneration was maintained at above market rates. Interim payment certificates were honoured promptly (within 14 days). The change request system 
ensured that all subcontract variations were fully priced and agreed by the client, 
consultants, main and subcontractors before they were implemented and any 
additional sums due were progressively included in the subcontractors’ interim 
certificates. The main contractor’s profit margin and preliminaries were pre-agreed, 
fixed and then ring-fenced. The level of preliminaries was above the prevailing market 
rates. In addition, the high-risk subcontract packages were included as provisional 
sums. Clearly, with nothing to ‘fight’ for, the best marketing for the consultants, main 
and subcontractors was to do a good job, project and maintain a favourable image with 
the client in the hope of securing repeat business. This was held by all to be a major 
driver, as winning work is very expensive and difficult. 
 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Site and design constraints, TOPs and the changing business case for various tenant 
spaces transformed the project into a very complicated and risky endeavour. The 
project benefited from a high level of cooperation and all the project’s targets were 
consistently met. It is clear from the foregoing that goal congruence and procedural 
justice concerns, rather than the desire to win incentives and/or avoid sanctions, were 
the overriding determinants of the high level of cooperation experienced on this project 
(cf. Bresnen and Marshall, 2000b). The evidence also indicates that there is more to 
cooperative interaction than transaction costs. The evidence generally supports 
Thompson et al.’s (1998) typology of contractual relationships, but also highlights the 
danger involved in constructing such rigid typologies. This project used a combination 
of arms-length and cooperative contractual instruments. The disconfirming effect of the 
traditional form of contract on the cooperative behaviours of the team is noteworthy. 
The presence of market prices helped this relationship by facilitating the development 
of trust. For this client, maintaining a good relationship with its suppliers was sufficient 
to secure their cooperation in providing a high quality of service to the end-users. This 
also removed the ‘hit or miss’ element associated with achieving the stated project 
objectives. As Bradach and Eccles (1989: 116) concluded, “human reason and social 
circumstance lead to much more complex forms of control”.  
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